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## BOOK REVIEWS

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*Plato's Phaedo.* Edited with introduction and notes by JOHN BURNET. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1911.

Professor Burnet has given us the latest and best complete text of Plato, the best English treatise on the pre-Socratic philosophers, the best edition of Aristotle's *Ethics*, and to these he now adds the best annotated edition of the *Phaedo*. By "best" I mean not the fullest or the most erudite, but the soundest, most accurate, and least misleading. In this edition as in his edition of the *Ethics*, Professor Burnet shows himself a master of the art of practically helpful annotation. In the combination of pertinency, precision, and brevity, his notes are models. He quotes precisely the relevant passage needed to bring out a point or clear up a difficulty, and quotes no more. Without making the interpretation of the *Phaedo* a pretext for grammatical disquisition, he sums up the conclusions of syntactical specialists in happy and convenient working formulas. Above all he seems to possess the instinctive right feeling for Greek idiom, the lack of which is the fatal defect in so much brilliant and ambitious work of our day. If these qualities sometimes seem to suffer temporary eclipse in the interesting but unverifiable speculations of the introduction, this is an accident most incident to philologists when they undertake to argue a thesis in the Aristotelian sense of the word.

The detailed discussion of the questions raised by Professor Burnet's introduction exceeds the scope of a reviewer. His general drift is to emphasize the Pythagorean element in Socrates and to attribute to him the doctrine of Platonic ideas and much further metaphysics on the ground that Plato could not have misrepresented his master in so solemn and pathetic a work as the *Phaedo*. These theses have not won much acceptance as yet, and I find it difficult to believe that on reconsideration Professor Burnet himself will maintain that the use of *φάμεν* in Plato and Aristotle raises a very strong presumption that the speaker is professing adherence to a school, or that Aristotle is really contrasting Socrates with the "friends of ideas" in the *Sophist*, and not with Plato when he says that Socrates did not "separate" universals. Similarly I believe that his second thoughts would cancel the statement (p. xxxvi) that "the Strong Man which is the subject of the *Gorgias* . . . is also the theme of the *Heracles* of Euripides." This is a momentary concession to the fallacy of the capital letter as practiced by a school of philology to which Professor Burnet does not belong. Surely the *Heracles* of Euripides is, in the words of Jebb (*Trach.* XI), "the strong

man who secures peace to the husbandman and an open path to the sailor," while the strong man of the *Gorgias* is the Nietzschean superman who refuses to be bound by bourgeois morality. They are both undoubtedly "strong," but to identify them as a theme of fourth-century discussion and debate is pure equivocation. The *Cyclops* and the *Phoenissae* offer remote parallels to the Callicles of the *Gorgias*, but the only strong man of the *Heracles* in this sense is the tyrant Lycus, to whom, I presume, Professor Burnet does not intend to refer. But waiving further discussion of the introduction, I will conclude by submitting to Professor Burnet's consideration a few dissenting judgments from some of the statements of his admirable commentary.

61 A 3: φιλοσοφίας . . . οὔσης μεγίστης μουσικῆς. The argument that this is distinctively Pythagorean doctrine is supplemented by Platonic parallels that will not bear scrutiny. In *Laws* 689D the "fairest harmony which would rightly be called the chief wisdom" is the harmony of belief and practice. And this so far from being "quite different from the metaphor" in *Laches* 188 D 3 is in moral effect virtually identical with it. There, says Professor Burnet, "the μουσικὸς ἀνὴρ is he whose character is tuned in a noble key." But Plato is much more specific than that. The true musician is ἡρμουςμένος αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τὸν βίον σύμφωνον τοῖς λόγοις πρὸς τὰ ἔργα, which is in substance the statement of the *Laws*.

In 65 D it is surely misleading to say that τῆς οὐσίας, "the reality," means the same thing as τὴν πάντων οὐσίαν in *Cratylus* 401 CD, which refers to the essence or nature of the world or things as a whole. In 69 AB, in the famous comparison of φρόνησις to the true νόμισμα, he brackets as interpolations the words καὶ τοῦτον μὲν πάντα and ὠνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα both for the sake of the sense and because "it is hardly credible that Plato should use ὠνούμενα as passive or πιπρασκόμενα at all." This requires him to pronounce πιπρασκομένην in *Sophist* 224 A 3, which Campbell retains, an interpolation also. I do not believe we know that Plato could not have used πιπρασκόμενα, but it would be easy to substitute ἀλλαττόμενα. At all events, these omissions destroy Plato's characteristic fullness of edifying expression and leave a curtailed sentence, the inadequacy of which is disguised by the rendering "When accompanied by this [i.e., wisdom] our goodness really is goodness." Where in the Greek do we find the first "goodness"? What Plato says is that πάντα (that is, all action and conduct) when so accompanied and so bought and sold (that is, exchanged, tested, measured) become true virtue. The meaning if not the precise syntax of this construction is repeated below in the words χωριζόμενα . . . καὶ ἀλλαττόμενα . . . μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἢ τοιαύτη ἀρετή. The objection then "that we are not supposed to buy and sell goodness for wisdom" falls to the ground; and in any case that kind of argument presses the image too hard. The passage is a characteristic Platonic protest against two ideas: (1) the idea that pleasure, not φρόνησις, is the measure or standard; (2) what is virtually the same thing, the idea

that there is no absolute standard, but things or acts are weighed against one another in that mere Heraclitean relativity; which Plato combats in every department of thought. Cf. *Theaetel.* 160 B, ἀλλήλοις γίγνεσθαι 182 B πρὸς ἀλληλα. In 74 D he reads ἡ ἐνδεῖ τι ἐκείνου τῷ τοιούτῳ εἶναι οἶον τὸ ἴσον as the "dative of that in which one is deficient." This is very harsh with the articular infinitive. I would emend ἐνδεῖ τι ἐκείνους τοῦ—they (i.e., τὰ ἐν τοῖς ξύλοις) lack something of being such as τὸ ἴσον. In 82 E he interprets δεινότης as "cleverness," "ingenuity": would it not be confined to persons in this sense?

The harmony passage (93) and the final proof of immortality (103–5) are too complicated for discussion in my space. Much qualification is required of the statement (93 A) that "Olympiodorus representing the school tradition is quite explicit" in affirming that Plato's argument rests on the hypothesis that harmony does not admit of degree. Olympiodorus gives also another interpretation incompatible with this which I think is more nearly right. Similar qualification is needed to the statement in 105 D that the assumption that the soul itself is a form or εἶδος is not required by the argument. Plato is not explicit; but the argument requires the soul to be an immaterial entity indissolubly associated with the idea of life. What save an idea can be thus indissolubly bound up with an idea? Cf. *Rep.* 476.

I am pleased to observe on 99 D the statement that ὄντα are things in the ordinary sense of the word; on 99 E that there is not any justification in Plato's writings for contrasting Socratic λόγοι with Platonic εἶδη [cf. my "Idea of Good in Plato's *Republic*," *University of Chicago Studies in Classical Philology*, I, 236; *A.J.P.*, IX, 304], and that it is not really the case that the λόγοι are mere images of τὰ ὄντα [cf. *A.J.P.*, IX, 304]; and on 101 E the note: "ἐπὶ τι ἱκανόν that is to an ἀρχή which no one will question." I had feared that the opposite doctrines were too firmly established in English opinion to be dislodged by argument. Professor Burnet discreetly eschews polemic; cf. my "Idea of Good in Plato's *Republic*," *University of Chicago Studies in Classical Philology*, I, 230–34,<sup>1</sup> and *A.J.P.*, X, 45.

PAUL SHOREY

*Lucian, with an English Translation.* By A. M. HARMON. Vol. I. "Loeb Classical Library." New York: Macmillan. \$1.50.

It required no little courage to undertake a new translation of Lucian so soon after the admirable work of the Fowlers. But to judge by this

<sup>1</sup> I cannot suppose that by the words "This is not necessarily an ἀρχή ἀνυπόθετος *Rep.* 510 b 7" Professor Burnet meant to imply that he differs from me on this point, though a careless reader might infer that he did. On p. 233 I explain both the ἱκανόν and the ἀνυπόθετον by willingness "to push the argument back until some common ground is reached," and on p. 234 I enter an explicit caveat against the supposition that I intend a literal and mechanical identification of expressions which I pronounce virtually equivalent in their logical function.